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Abstract
We present two new statistical machine learning methods designed to learn
on fully homomorphic encrypted (FHE) data. The introduction of FHE schemes
following Gentry (2009) opens up the prospect of privacy preserving statistical
machine learning analysis and modelling of encrypted data without compromising
security constraints. We propose tailored algorithms for applying extremely ran-
dom forests, involving a new cryptographic stochastic fraction estimator, and na¨ıve
Bayes, involving a semi-parametric model for the class decision boundary, and show
how they can be used to learn and predict from encrypted data. We demonstrate
that these techniques perform competitively on a variety of classification data sets
and provide detailed information about the computational practicalities of these
and other FHE methods.
Keywords: homomorphic encryption, data privacy, encrypted machine learning,
encrypted statistical analysis, encrypted na¨ıve Bayes, encrypted random forests
1 Introduction
Privacy requirements around data can impede the uptake and application of statistical
analysis and machine learning algorithms. Traditional cryptographic methods enable safe
long-term storage of information, but when analysis is to be performed the data must first
be decrypted. Rivest et al. (1978) initially showed that it may be possible to design an
encryption scheme that supports restricted mathematical computations without decrypt-
ing. However, it was not until Gentry (2009) that a scheme able to support theoretically
arbitrary computation was proposed. Briefly here, these so-called homomorphic encryp-
tion schemes allow for certain mathematical operators such as addition and multiplication
to be performed directly on the cipher texts (encrypted data), yielding encrypted results
which upon decryption render the same results as if the operations had been performed
on the plain texts (original data). These schemes are reviewed in a companion report
to this paper (Aslett, Esperanc¸a and Holmes, 2015) in a manner which is accessible to
statisticians and machine learners with accompanying high level open source software in
R to allow users to explore the various issues1.
1In this report we will assume that the reader is familiar with the basic concepts of fully homomorphic
encryption and some of the practical computational constraints, as overviewed in Aslett, Esperanc¸a and
Holmes (2015) and Gentry (2010).
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Privacy constraints enter into many areas of modern data analysis from biobanks
and medical data to the impending wave of ‘wearable devices’ such as smart watches,
generating large amounts of personal biomedical data (Anderlik and Rothstein, 2001;
Kaufman et al., 2009; Angrist, 2013; Brenner, 2013; Ginsburg, 2014). Moreover with
the advent of cloud computing many data owners are looking to outsource storage and
computing, but particularly with non-centralised services there may be concerns with
security issues during data analysis (Liu et al., 2011). Indeed, encryption may even
be desirable on internal network connected systems as providing an additional layer of
security.
Although homomorphic encryption in theory promises arbitrary computation, the
practical constraints mean that this is presently out of reach for many algorithms (Aslett,
Esperanc¸a and Holmes, 2015). This motivates the interest in tailored machine learning
methods which can be practically applied. This paper contributes two such methods
with FHE approximations to extremely random forests and na¨ıve Bayes developed, such
that both learning and prediction can be performed encrypted, something which is not
possible with the original versions of either technique.
We are not the first to explore secure machine learning approaches to encryption.
Graepel et al. (2012) implemented two binary classification algorithms for homomor-
phically encrypted data: Linear Means and Fisher’s Linear Discriminant. They make
scaling adjustments which preserve the results, but leave the fundamental methodology
unchanged. Bost et al. (2014) developed a two party computation framework and used
a mix of different partly and fully homomorphic encryption schemes which allows them
to use machine learning techniques based on hyperplane decisions, na¨ıve Bayes and bi-
nary decision trees — again the fundamental methodologies are unchanged, but here
substantial communication between two (‘honest but curious’) parties is required.
These are two existing approaches to working within the constraints imposed by ho-
momorphic encryption: either by the use of existing methods amenable to homomorphic
computation; or by invoking multi-party methods. Here, we consider tailored approxima-
tions to two statistical machine learning models which make them amenable to homomor-
phic encryption, so that all stages of fitting and prediction can be computed encrypted.
Thus, herein we contribute two machine learning algorithms tailored to the framework
of fully homomorphic encryption and provide an R package implementing them (Aslett
and Esperanc¸a, 2015). These techniques do not require multi party communication.
Aside from classification techniques, other privacy preserving statistical methods have
been proposed in the literature such as small-P linear regression (P ≤ 5; Wu and Haven,
2012) and predictive machine learning using pre-trained models (e.g., logistic regression;
Bos et al., 2014)
In Section 2 a brief recap of homomorphic encryption and consequences for data
representation is presented, with the unfamiliar reader directed to Aslett, Esperanc¸a and
Holmes (2015) for a fuller review. Section 3 contains a novel implementation of extremely
random forests (Geurts et al., 2006; Cutler and Zhao, 2001) including a stochastic ap-
proximation to tree voting. In Section 4 a novel semi-parametric na¨ıve Bayes algorithm
is developed that utilises logistic regression to define the decision boundaries. Section
5 details empirical results of classification performance on a variety of tasks taken from
the UCI machine learning repository, as well as demonstrating the practicality with per-
formance metrics from fitting a completely random forest using the Amazon EC2 cloud
platform. Section 6 offers a discussion and conclusions.
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2 Homomorphic encryption and data representation
We shall adopt a public key encryption scheme having public key kp and secret key
ks and equipped with algorithms Enc(kp, ·) and Dec(ks, ·) which encrypt and decrypt
messages respectively. Encryption maps a message m ∈ M from message space to an
element of cipher text space c ∈ C. A scheme is then said to be homomorphic for some
operations ◦ ∈ FM acting in message space (such as addition or multiplication) if there
are corresponding operations  ∈ FC acting in cipher text space satisfying the property:
Dec(ks, Enc(kp,m1)  Enc(kp,m2)) = m1 ◦m2 ∀m1,m2 ∈M
A scheme is fully homomorphic if it is homomorphic for both addition and multiplication.
We shall consider herein the particular homomorphic encryption scheme of Fan and Ver-
cauteren (2012), a high performance and easy to use implementation of which is available
in R (Aslett, 2014a), and assume that the reader is familiar with the basic principles of
this approach (Aslett, Esperanc¸a and Holmes, 2015).
2.1 Practical limitations
Although FHE schemes exist, it is worth briefly recalling the practical constraints in im-
plementing arbitrary algorithms, as they impact and motivate the tailored developments
presented in this paper. Some of the current practical implementation issues include:
Message space: Real value encryption lies outside of existing FHE schemes so that
measurements must typically be stored as integers. Given an integer measurement, x,
the choice of the corresponding message space representation, M , will have consequences
for computational cost and memory requirements. For example, x, could be directly
represented in an integer message space M ⊂ Z, or in a binary message space M = {0, 1}T
involves writing down the value in base 2 (x =
∑
2ibi) and encrypting each bit (each bi)
separately.
The major consequence is that performing simple operations such as addition and
multiplication under the binary representation involves manual binary arithmetic, which
is much more expensive than the single operation involved when the natural integer
representation is used. For instance, adding two 32-bit values in a binary representation
would involve over 256 fundamental operations by using standard full binary adder logic.
Consequently, we do not consider FHE schemes where binary representation is the only
option and instead require M ⊂ Z for the new techniques to be presented in Sections 3
and 4.
However, although M ⊂ Z is more efficient computationally, it still does not naturally
accommodate the kinds of data commonly encountered in statistics and machine learning
applications, so that even representing data requires careful consideration.
Cipher text size: existing FHE schemes result in substantial inflation in the size of the
data. For example, in Fan and Vercauteren (2012) the cipher text space is C = Zq[x] ×
Zq[x], a cartesian product of high degree polynomial rings with coefficients belonging to
a large integer ring. Therefore when using the default parameter values in that paper
the two polynomials are of degree 4, 095, with each of the 8, 192 coefficients being 128-bit
integers. This means that 1MB of message data can grow to approximately 16.4GB of
encrypted data, representing a 1,600 fold increase in storage size.
Computational speed: due in part to the increased data size, but also due to the
complex cipher text spaces, the cost of performing operations is high. For example, in Fan
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and Vercauteren (2012) arithmetic for simple messages in M is achieved by performing
complex polynomial arithmetic in C.
To make this concrete, imagine adding the numbers 2 and 3 to produce 5. Basic
parameter choices for the Fan and Vercauteren (2012) encryption scheme will mean that
not only does this simple addition involve adding 4, 095 degree polynomials, but the 128-
bit integer coefficients of those polynomials are too large to be natively represented or
operated on by modern CPUs.
Indeed, the theoretical latency for integer addition on a modern CPU is 1 clock cycle,
so that 2+3 executes in sub 1 nanosecond (10−9s). By contrast, the optimised C++ im-
plementation of Fan and Vercauteren (2012) in Aslett (2014a) takes around 3 milliseconds
(10−3s) to perform the same computation encrypted.
Division and comparison: existing integer message space schemes cannot perform
encrypted division and are unable to evaluate binary comparison operations such as
=, < and >. So that mathematical operations are currently restricted to addition and
multiplication.
Cryptographic noise: the semantic security necessary in existing schemes involves
injection of some noise into the cipher texts, which grows as operations are performed.
Typically the noise growth under multiplication can be significant so that after a certain
depth of multiplications the cipher text must be ‘refreshed’. This refresh step is usually
computationally expensive, so that in practice the parameters of the encryption scheme
are usually chosen a priori to ensure that all necessary operations for the algorithm to be
applied can be performed without any refresh being required.
Thus, the restriction to integers, addition and multiplication, combined with a limit
on noise growth emanating from multiplication operations, means that in reality the
constraints of homomorphic encryption allow only moderate degree polynomials of inte-
gers to be computed encrypted. Even so, the speed of evaluation will be relatively slow
compared to the unencrypted counterparts, as demonstrated in our examples in Section
5.
2.2 Data representation
One consequence of the above is that we need to transform data to make it amenable
to FHE analysis. We show that certain transformations will also allow for limited forms
of computation involving comparison operations such as =, < and >. We consider two
simple approaches below.
2.2.1 Quantisation for real values
Given that many current homomorphic schemes work in the space of integers (Aslett,
Esperanc¸a and Holmes, 2015), it may be necessary to make approximations when manip-
ulating real-valued variables. Graepel et al. (2012) proposed an approximation method
where real values are first approximated by rationals (two integers factors) and then de-
nominators cleared—by multiplying the entire dataset by a pre-specified integer—and
rounding the results to the nearest integer.
One suggestion here is more straightforward: choose a desired level of accuracy, say φ,
which represents the number of decimal places to be retained; then multiply the data by
10φ and round to the nearest integer. This avoids the need for rational approximations
and the requirement for a double approximation caused by the denominator-clearing step.
Encrypted statistical machine learning 5
More precisely, for a given precision φ ∈ N ∪ {0}, a real value z ∈ R is approximated
by z˙ = b10φ · ze, where b·e denotes rounding to the nearest integer. This transformation
adequately represents real values in an integer space, in the sense that smooth relative
distances are approximately maintained.
For data sets of finite precision (the typical case in real applications), no loss of pre-
cision is necessary if φ is selected to be equal to the accuracy (i.e., number of decimal
places) of the most accurate value in the data set. Otherwise, in the cases where trans-
formations are required (e.g., logarithms), precision is under the user’s control. Note
that the parameter φ regulates the accuracy of the input (data), not that of the output
(result). To the extent that the output accuracy depends on the input accuracy and also
on the complexity of the algorithm, the choice of φ should take both these factors into
consideration.
In particular, when evaluating homogeneous polynomial expressions, then no interme-
diate scaling is required since every term will have scaling 10dφ, where d is the degree of
the homogeneous polynomial. Where scaling is required, it will be known a priori based
on the algorithm and is not data dependent.
2.2.2 Quantisation to categorical or ordinal
The approach above encodes real values by an integer representation, but this increases
substantially the number of multiplication operations involved. Instead, by transforming
continuous measurement values into categorical or ordinal ones via a quantisation proce-
dure, it is possible to dispense with the need to track appropriate scaling in the algorithm.
This simple solution has not, as far as we’re aware, been taken in the applied cryptogra-
phy literature to date. Moreover, this quantisation procedure allows some computations
involving comparison operations (=, <,>) to now be performed as detailed below.
Let X be a design matrix, with elements xij recording the jth predictor variable for the
ith observation. It may be that xij ∈ R or xij may be a categorical value. In both cases,
consider a partition of the support of variable j to be quantised Kj = {Kj1 , . . . , Kjm}.
That is, xij ∈
⋃m
k=1K
j
k ∀ i, j and Kji ∩Kjk = ∅ ∀ j,∀ i 6= k. There are at least two routes
one may take to quantisation:
1. xij is encoded as an indicator x˜ijk ∈ {0, 1} ∀ k, where for each continuous variable
j, x˜ijk = 1 ⇐⇒ xij ∈ Kjk and x˜ijl = 0 ∀ l 6= k. For example, a natural ordinal
choice for Kj is the partition induced by the quintiles of that variable.
2. If the partition also satisfies y < z ⇐⇒ y ∈ Kji , z ∈ Kjk and i < k ∀ j, then
another option is to replace the value of xij by a corresponding ordinal value, so
that x˜ij = k ⇐⇒ xij ∈ Kjk so that the support becomes x˜ij ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,mj}.
Both approaches transform continuous, categorical or ordinal values to an encoding
which can be represented directly in the message space of homomorphic schemes. Note
that for categorical or discrete variables in the design matrix, these procedures can be
exact, whilst for continuous ones they may introduce an approximation.
Thus, for example a design matrix X would map to two possible representations X˜1
and X2 corresponding to the different procedures above, with Xi1 ∈ {0, 1}, Xi2 ∈ {1, 2, 3}
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and Xi3 ∈ R:
X =

0 1 1.7
1 2 1.9
0 3 1.6
...
...
...
xi1 xi2 xi3
→ X˜1 =

0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
...
...
...
x˜i11 x˜i21 x˜i22 x˜i23 x˜i31 x˜i32 x˜i33 x˜i34 x˜i35

or, under method 2 → X2 =

0 1 3
1 2 5
0 3 1
...
...
...
x˜i1 x˜i2 x˜i3

Recall from §2.1 and Aslett, Esperanc¸a and Holmes (2015) that comparisons of equal-
ity cannot usually be made on encrypted content. However, Method 1 can be seen to
enable encrypted indicators for simple tests of equality, since comparisons simply become
inner products:∑
∀ k
x˜i1jkx˜i2jk = 1 ⇐⇒ obs i1 and i2 have equal quantised value on variable j (1)
otherwise the sum is zero. In particular, note that this is a homogeneous polynomial of
degree 2, requiring only 1 multiplication depth in the analysis.
Likewise, it is possible to evaluate an encrypted indicator for whether a value lies in
a given range, because:∑
k∈K
x˜ijk = 1 ⇐⇒ obs i has quantised value in the set K (2)
otherwise the sum is zero.
Conversely, Method 2 may be preferred in linear modelling situations which would
then represent the change in y for an incremental change in the quantised encoding,
whereas in a linear modelling context Method 1 results in separate estimates of effect for
each category of encoding.
Note that this is not a binary representation of the kind critiqued in section 2.1 —
here they are binary indicator values, with an integer representation in an integer space.
Therefore, to count the number of indicators, for example, is simple addition, as opposed
to the binary arithmetic described earlier.
In the next two sections we present the tailored statistical machine learning techniques
developed specifically with the constraints of homomorphic encryption in mind.
3 Extremely Random Forests
Extremely or perfectly random forests (Geurts et al., 2006; Cutler and Zhao, 2001) can
exhibit competitive classification performance against their more traditional counterpart
(Breiman, 2001). Forest methods combine many decision trees in an ensemble classifier
and empirically often perform well on complex non-linear classification problems. Tra-
ditional random forests involve extensive comparison operations and evaluation of split
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quality at each level, operations which are either prohibitive or impossible to compute
homomorphically in current schemes. However, we show that a tailored version of ex-
tremely or perfectly random forests can be computed fully encrypted, where both fitting
and prediction are possible, with all operations performed in cipher text space. Moreover
we highlight that the completely random nature of the methods allows for incremental
learning and divide-and-conquer learning on large data, so that massive parallelism can
be employed to ameliorate the high costs of encrypted computation. In particular, this
is demonstrated in a real 1, 152 core cluster example in §5.4.
3.1 Completely Random Forests (CRF)
To begin, we assume the training data are encoded as in Method 1 (§2.2.2) so that the
comparison identities in (1) and (2) can be used. In overview, the most basic form of the
proposed algorithm then proceeds as follows:
Step 1. Predictor variables at each level in a tree are chosen uniformly (“completely”) at
random from a subset of the full predictor set. Additionally, the split points are
chosen uniformly (“completely”) at random from a set of potential split points.
Identity (2) then provides an indicator variable for which branch a variable lies in,
so that a product of such indicators provides an indicator for a full branch of a
decision tree. Then (1) enables the pseudo-comparison involved in counting how
many observations of a given class are in each leaf of the tree.
Step 2. Step 1 is repeated for each tree in the forest independently, using a random subset
of predictors per tree, so that many such trees are grown. Each observation casts
one vote per tree, according to the terminal leaf and class to which it belongs. Note
that Step 2 can be performed in parallel as the trees are grown independently of
one another.
Step 3. At prediction the same identities as in Step 2 can be used to create an indicator
which picks out the appropriate vote from each tree, for each class.
The detailed algorithm is given in Appendix A.
This algorithm is referred to as a ‘completely random forest’ since it takes the random
growth of trees to a logical extreme with tree construction performed completely blindfold
from the data. This is in contrast to, for example, extremely random forests (Geurts et al.,
2006) where optimisation takes place over a random selection of splits and variables, and
tree growth can terminate upon observing node purity or underpopulation. It is also
different to perfectly random tree ensembles (Cutler and Zhao, 2001), where random
split points are constructed between observations known to belong to different classes.
Neither of those approaches can be directly implemented within the constraints of fully
homomorphic encryption.
The model returns an encrypted prediction,
νˆ?c ← CRF(x˜, y˜, x˜?)
as a count of the votes2 for each class category, c, in message space yi ∈ C, with encrypted
training data {x˜, y˜} and encrypted test prediction point x˜?. The user decrypts using the
2The vote is the total number of training samples of category c laying in the same root node as
prediction point x? across the trees.
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private encryption key zˆ?c = Dec(ks, νˆ
?
c ) and forms a predictive empirical ‘probability’ as:
pˆ?c =
zˆ?c∑|C|
c=1 zˆ
?
c
(3)
3.2 Cryptographic stochastic fraction estimate
In conventional forest algorithms each tree gets a single prediction ‘vote’ regardless of
the number of training samples that were present in a leaf node for prediction. This is in
contrast to the above, where due to encryption constraints the algorithm simply counts
the total number of training samples from each category falling in the leaf node of the
prediction point, summed across all trees. The difficulty in matching to convention is
that converting the number of training samples in a category to the vote of the most
probable category for each tree is not possible under current FHE schemes, and would
need to be done through decryption.
To address this we propose a method of making an asymptotically consistent stochastic
approximation to enable voting from each tree. This is done by exploiting the fact that
the adjustment required can be approximated via an appropriate encrypted Bernoulli
process by sampling with replacement. This stochastic adjustment can be computed
entirely encrypted.
There are several approaches to estimating class probabilities from an ensemble of
trees. Perhaps most common is the average vote forest, which is not possible because
comparisons between class votes to establish the maximum vote in a leaf are not possible.
An alternative is the relative class frequencies approach, which appears also to be beyond
reach encrypted because of the need to perform division and representation of values in
(0, 1). An obvious solution to the representation issue as already discussed in §2.2 is to
say:
votes for class c in leaf b of tree t =
⌊
Nρtbc∑
c ρ
t
bc
⌉
≈ ρtbc
⌊
N∑
c ρ
t
bc
⌉
where b·e denotes rounding to the nearest integer, N is the number of training observa-
tions, ρtbc counts the number of training samples of class c laying in the bth terminal leaf
node of the tth tree (see Appendix A for details), giving a scale {0, . . . , N} which can be
represented encrypted, albeit seemingly still not computed due to the division.
Note that
∑
c ρ
t
bc ≤ N , so that the reciprocal of the second term above lies in (0, 1)
and can be treated as a probability, and recall that X ∼ Geometric(p) =⇒ E[X] = p−1.
In other words, one can view an unbiased stochastic approximation to the fraction we
require to be a draw from a Geometric distribution with probability
∑
c ρ
t
bc
N
.
This transforms the problem from performing division to performing encrypted ran-
dom number generation, where the distribution parameter involves division, which ini-
tially may seem worse. However, observe that each ρtbc term arises from summing a binary
vector from {0, 1}N :
ρtbc =
N∑
i=1
ηtibc where η
t
ibc := y˜icI(x˜i ∈ b)
Consequently, exchanging the order of summation,
∑
c ρ
t
bc can be treated as a sum of a
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binary vector length N :
|C|∑
c=1
ρtbc =
N∑
i=1
ηtib where η
t
ib =
|C|∑
c=1
ηtibc
where |C| is the number of classes. In other words, the length N vector ηtib (for each
t, b) is an encrypted sequence of 0’s and 1’s with precisely the correct number of 1’s such
that blind random sampling with replacement from the elements produces an (encrypted)
Bernoulli process with success probability
∑
c ρ
t
bc
N
. Hereinafter, refer to this as simply ηi,
the dependence on tree and leaf being implicit.
Thus, the objective is to sample a Geometric random variable encrypted, but at
this stage it is only possible to generate the encrypted Bernoulli process underlying the
desired Geometric distribution. This finally shifts the problem to that of counting the
number of leading zeros in an encrypted Bernoulli process: in other words, resample with
replacement from η1, . . . , ηN a vector of length M , say, and without decrypting establish
the number of leading zeros.
To achieve this it is possible to draw on an algorithm used in CPU hardware to
determine the number of leading zeros in an IEEE floating point number, an operation
required when renormalising the mantissa (the coefficient in scientific notation). Let
η1, . . . , ηM be a resampled vector and assume M is a power of 2 (the reason being that
this maximises the estimation accuracy for a fixed number of multiplications):
1. For l ∈ {0, . . . , log2(M)− 1}:
• Set ηi = ηi ∨ ηi−2l = ηi + ηi−2l − ηiηi−2l ∀ 2l + 1 ≤ i ≤M
2. The number of leading zeros is M −∑Mi=1 ηi
In summary, this corresponds to increasing power of 2 bit-shifts which are then OR’d
with itself, all of which can be computed encrypted.
Thus, an approximately unbiased (for large enough M) encrypted estimator of the
desired fraction,
⌊
N∑
c ρ
t
bc
⌉
, is M −∑Mi=1 ηi + 1 upon termination of the above algorithm.
It is important to note that the multiplicative depth required for this algorithm is M ,
and recall that multiplicative depth is restricted under current FHE schemes (Aslett,
Esperanc¸a and Holmes, 2015) if expensive cipher text refreshing is to be avoided. Hence,
in practise typically the resample size will be restricted to a small value like M = 32
even for large N datasets. However, this is desirable: it enables some shrinkage to take
place by placing an upper bound of M on the fraction estimate. Thus, for a choice of
M = 32, terminal leaves will in expectation have the correct adjustment if at least 1
32
of the training data are in that decision path of the tree. For example, in a training
data set of size N = 1000, the stochastic fraction is correct in expectation for all leaves
containing at least 1000
32
= 31 observations — fewer observations and the leaf votes will
undergo shrinkage in expectation.
Note in particular that CRFs are inherently discrete and the probability of regrowing
exactly the same tree twice is not measure zero, so that asymptotically the same tree
will be regrown infinitely often with probability 1. If the encrypted stochastic fraction is
recomputed in each new tree then asymptotically the correct adjustment will be made.
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3.3 Further implementation issues
We highlight a couple of additional implementation issues that are important for the
practical machine learning of completely random forests on FHE data.
3.3.1 Calibration
The first point to note is that there is no calibration of the trees, or indeed the forest.
Consequently there should be no presumption that arg maxc{p?c : c = 1, . . . , |C|} pro-
vides the “best” prediction for class c under unequal misclassification loss. As such, the
traditional training and testing setup is crucially important in order to select optimal
decision boundaries according to whatever criteria are relevant to the subject matter of
the problem, such as false positive and negative rates. This is the only step which must
be performed unencrypted: the responses of the test set must be visible, though note
that the predictors need not since step 3 for prediction is computed homomorphically.
3.3.2 Incremental and parallel computation
One key advantage of CRFs is that learning is incremental as new data become available:
there is no need to recompute the entire fit as there is no optimisation step, so that once
used encrypted data can be archived at lower cost and moreover adding new observations
has linear growth in computational cost.
Indeed the whole algorithm is embarrassingly parallel both in the number of trees and
the number of observations. One can independently compute the trees and data can be
split into shards whereby ρtbc is computed for each shard separately using the same seed
in the random number generator for growing trees and then simply additively combined
afterwards (a comparatively cheap operation). This is highlighted in a real-world large
scale example in §5.4.
3.3.3 Theoretical parameter requirements for Fan and Vercauteren (2012)
For a discussion of practical requirements for the parameter selection in homomorphic
encryption schemes, see Appendix B.
The CRF fitting, prediction and forest combination are all implemented in the open
source R package EncryptedStats (Aslett and Esperanc¸a, 2015) and can be run on
unencrypted data as well as data encrypted using the HomomophicEncryption (Aslett,
2014a) package. These are briefly described in Appendix D.
The next section introduces the second novel method tailored for FHE.
4 Na¨ıve Bayes Classifiers
The Na¨ıve Bayes (NB) classifier is a popular generative classification algorithm that mod-
els the joint probability of predictor variables independently for each response class, and
then uses Bayes rule and an independence assumption among predictors to construct
a simple classifier (Ng and Jordan, 2002; Hastie et al., 2009, p.210). The advantages
and disadvantages have been extensively described in the literature, for example (Rennie
et al., 2003). Although the independence assumption underlying NB is often violated,
the linear growth in complexity for large number of predictors and the simple closed-form
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expressions for the decision rules make the approach attractive in “big-data” situations.
Moreover as highlighted by Domingos and Pazzani (1997) there is an important distinc-
tion between classification accuracy (predicting the correct class) and accurately estimat-
ing the class probability, and hence NB can perform well in classification error rate even
when the independence assumption is violated by a wide margin. Essentially, although
it produces biased probability estimates, this does not necessarily translate into a high
classification error (Hand and Yu, 2001). Consequently, NB remains a well established
and popular method.
The Na¨ıve Bayes framework
Consider the binary classification problem with a set of P predictors x = {xj}j∈N1:P ∈ X
and let y ∈ {0, 1}. The NB classifier uses Bayes theorem,
P(y|x) ∝ P(x|y)P(y), (4)
for prediction coupled with an independence assumption,
P(x|y) =
P∏
j=1
P(xj|y), (5)
which embodies a compromise between accuracy and tractability, to obtain a conditional
class probability. This allows NB to separately model the conditional distributions of pre-
dictor variables, {P(x|y = 1),P(x|y = 0)}, and then construct the prediction probability
via Bayes theorem,
P(y = 1|x) = P(x|y = 1)P(y = 1)
P(x|y = 1)P(y = 1) + P(x|y = 0)P(y = 0) . (6)
The most popular forms for the distributions P(xj|y) are multinomial for categorical
predictors and Gaussian for continuous predictors. As shown in the Appendix C, it is
possible to work with multinomial distributions directly in cipher text space, albeit at
a multiplicative depth of 3P − 1, but the Gaussian distributions lay outside of FHE. In
the next subsection we propose a tailored semi-parametric NB model that is amenable
to cipher text computation. Crucially this novel method scales to an arbitrary number
of predictors at no additional multiplicative depth, making it well suited to encrypted
computation.
4.1 Semi-parametric Na¨ıve Bayes
The NB classifier solves the classification task using a generative approach, i.e., by mod-
elling the distribution of the predictors (Ng and Jordan, 2002). However, distributions
such as the Gaussian cannot be directly implemented within an FHE as they involve
division and exponentiation operators as well as continuous values. Here, we show that
it is possible to model the decision boundary between the two response classes more ex-
plicitly — without a parametric model for the distributions of the predictors — while
still remaining in the NB framework. As will become clear, this corresponds to a discrim-
inative approach to classification where the decision boundary of the conditional class
probabilities is modelled semi-parametrically.
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To begin, note that the expression for the log-odds prediction from NB can be rear-
ranged to give
log
(
P(y = 1|x)
P(y = 0|x)
)
= log
(
P(y = 1)
P(y = 0)
P∏
j=1
P(xj|y = 1)
P(xj|y = 0)
)
= log
([
P(y = 0)
P(y = 1)
](P−1) P∏
j=1
[
P(xj|y = 1)
P(xj|y = 0) ·
P(y = 1)
P(y = 0)
])
= log
([
P(y = 0)
P(y = 1)
](P−1) P∏
j=1
P(y = 1|xj)
P(y = 0|xj)
)
= (P − 1) log
(
P(y = 0)
P(y = 1)
)
+
P∑
j=1
log
(
P(y = 1|xj)
P(y = 0|xj)
)
.
(7)
Using this identity, we now propose to model the decision boundary P(y|xj) directly using
the linear logistic form, rather than parameterise P(xj|y) via a distribution function. That
is we assume,
log
(
P(y = 1|xj)
P(y = 0|xj)
)
= f(xj;αj, βj) and
P(y = 0)
P(y = 1)
= θ (8)
where, in this work, f(xj;αj, βj) is taken to be a linear predictor of the form αj + βjxj.
The independence structure means that each term can be optimised independently by
way of an approximation to logistic regression, amenable to homomorphic computation
(presented below; §4.2), since the standard iteratively reweighted least squares fitting
procedure is not computable under the restrictions of homomorphic encryption. Optimi-
sation of θ is done independently of {αj, βj},
θˆ =
∑N
i=1 yi
N −∑Ni=1 yi . (9)
The estimated log-odds are then
ψˆ(x; θˆ, αˆ, βˆ) = log
(
P(y = 1|x; θˆ, αˆ, βˆ)
P(y = 0|x; θˆ, αˆ, βˆ)
)
= (P − 1) log(θˆ) +
P∑
j=1
f(xj; θˆ, αˆj, βˆj) (10)
or, equivalently, in terms of conditional class probabilities
P(y = 1|x; θˆ, αˆ, βˆ) = 1
1 + exp{−ψˆ(x; θˆ, αˆ, βˆ)} . (11)
Hence equation (11) can be computed after decryption from the factors (numerator/de-
nominator) that comprise {θˆ, αˆ, βˆ} to form the conditional class predictions.
This defines a semi-parametric Na¨ıve Bayes (SNB) classification model that assumes a
logistic form for the decision boundary in each predictor variable, and where each logistic
regression involves at most two parameters. As we will show in the next section, in this
setting there is a suitable approximation to the maximum likelihood estimates which are
traditionally computed using the iteratively reweighted least squares algorithm.
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4.2 Logistic Regression
The SNB algorithm proposed in the previous section requires a homomorphic implemen-
tation of simple logistic regression involving an intercept and a single slope parameter.
In this section an approximation to logistic regression based on the first iteration of the
Iteratively Reweighted Least Squares (IRLS) algorithm is proposed and some of its the-
oretical properties analysed. Apart from its use in SNB, the approximation to logistic
regression described in this section also stands on its own as a classification method
amenable to homomorphic computation.
4.2.1 First step of Iteratively Reweighted Least Squares
Optimisation in logistic regression is typically achieved via IRLS based on Newton–
Raphson iterations. Starting from an initial guess β(0), the first step involves updating
the auxiliary variables
η
(0)
i = Xi•β
(0)
µ
(0)
i =
exp
(
η
(0)
i
)
1 + exp
(
η
(0)
i
)
w
(0)
ii = µ
(0)
i
(
1− µ(0)i
)
z
(0)
i = η
(0)
i +
(
w
(0)
ii
)−1 (
yi − µ(0)i
)
(12)
where Xi• denotes the ith row of X. By starting with an initial value β
(0) = (0, . . . , 0)T
the initialisation step of the algorithm is simplified: for all i ∈ N1:N we have η(0)i = 0,
µ
(0)
i = 1/2, w
(0)
i,i = 1/4 and z
(0)
i = 4yi − 2. In the second step, the parameter estimates of
β are updated using generalised least squares
β(1) =
(
XTW (0)X
)−1
XTW (0)z(0) (13)
and these two steps are repeated until convergence is achieved.
In what follows, only the first-iteration update of β is considered, because it pro-
vides an approximation to logistic regression and, most importantly, one which is com-
putationally feasible under homomorphic encryption; this will be termed the one-step
approximation. Note that implementation of the full IRLS algorithm is infeasible un-
der FHE because the weights wii can not be updated as this requires the evaluation of
non-polynomial functions.
The particular form of these (paired) one-step approximating equations for an in-
tercept and a single slope parameter is shown in the following section. We show an
additional simplification (so-called unpaired estimates) which improves encrypted com-
putational characteristics further at the cost of greater approximation.
4.2.2 Paired, one-step approximation to simple logistic regression
In the SNB model the conditional log-odds are optimised for each variable separately,
following the independence assumption. In this case the the design matrix X contains a
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single column of 1’s for the intercept and a single predictor variable column, and the first
step of the IRLS leads to
{αˆj, βˆj} = {aj/dj, bj/dj} , ∀j ∈ N1:P (14)
and where
aj =
(
N∑
i=1
x2ij
)(
N∑
i=1
z
(0)
i
)
−
(
N∑
i=1
xij
)(
N∑
i=1
xijz
(0)
i
)
(15)
bj = N
N∑
i=1
xijz
(0)
i −
(
N∑
i=1
xij
)(
N∑
i=1
z
(0)
i
)
(16)
dj = N
N∑
i=1
x2ij −
(
N∑
i=1
xij
)2
(17)
To use the one-step approximation in combination with the SNB classifier detailed above
(§4.1), the quantity {αˆj + βˆjx?j} — required for the classification of a new observation
x? = {xj}j∈N1:P — can then be estimated as ej/dj, where ej = aj + bjx?j .
This corresponds to a standard, paired optimisation strategy, that is, to optimise
intercept and slope jointly, using an approximation targeting
arg sup
αj ,βj
f(xj;αj, βj), ∀j ∈ N1:P . (18)
An alternative to this approach would be to optimise intercept and slope indepen-
dently (i.e., in an unpaired fashion), that is, targeting
arg sup
αj
f(xj;αj, βj = 0) and arg sup
βj
f(xj;αj = 0, βj), ∀j ∈ N1:P (19)
in which case all αj take the same value and, therefore, this is equivalent to estimating
all βj independently and including a global intercept, Pαj for some j.
We will see that this is computationally appealing due to the simplified estimating
equations when using the same one-step approximation.
4.2.3 Unpaired, one-step approximation to simple logistic regression
In the case of unpaired estimation (or in the absence of an intercept term) the estimating
equations for αj and βj are simpler. To distinguish between unpaired and paired estimates
we denote the unpaired by α˜j and β˜j, respectively. All α˜j have a common form
α˜j =
1
N
N∑
i=1
z
(0)
i (20)
while β˜j have the form
β˜j =
∑N
i=1 xijz
(0)
i∑N
i=1 x
2
ij
. (21)
Note that this unpaired formulation also arises in the case of centred predictors,
E[xj] = 0, so that the unpaired approach is completely equivalent to the paired approach
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Figure 1: Shrinkage in β˜. Because the estimator β˜ is bounded between -2 and 2, the
shrunk value is always equal to 2 for absolute values of β greater than ≈ 2.5.
and introduces no additional approximation if it is possible for the data to be centred
prior to encryption. Note that this is trivially achievable for ordinal quintile data by
representing each quintile by {−2,−1, 0, 1, 2}, rather than {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Consequently,
where it is possible to centre the data it should be done in order to take advantage of
these computational benefits at no approximation cost.
Furthermore, when the data are represented as in section 2.2.2, this can be rewritten
as follows. Define the following auxiliary variables
n
[1]
jk =
∑
i:yi=1
x˜ijk =
∑
i:x˜ijk=1
yi, njk =
N∑
i=1
x˜ijk, n
[0]
jk = njk − n[1]jk (22)
In words, n
[c]
jk counts the number of observation in the kth bin of the jth predictor —or,
equivalently, the number of elements of X•j (the jth column of X) which are equal to
k—and for which the corresponding response is equal to c, for c ∈ {0, 1}. In this case,
Equation (21) becomes
β˜j = 2
 Mj∑
k=1
k2
N∑
i=1
x˜ijk
−1 Mj∑
k=1
k
(
n
[1]
jk − n[0]jk
)
(23)
so that for a binary predictor xij ∈ {0, 1} we find
β˜j =
2
n
(
n
[1]
j − n[0]j
)
. (24)
where n =
∑
i xij. This simple expression aids in the derivation of some theoretical
results regarding the bias of the estimator.
Shrinkage of β˜
Let β denote the true parameter and β˜ denote the one-step IRLS estimate from Equation
(24). The one-step “early stopping” shrinks or “regularises” the estimate towards the
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Figure 2: (Left) For all p, the generalisation error shrinks monotonically with increased
n and converges to an asymptotic curve—in green; (Right) The rate at which the gen-
eralisation error curves approach the asymptotic curve is decreasing with n for all values
of p (several shown here) and stabilises at around n = 20.
origin as,
E[β˜ − β] = E
[
2
(
n[1] − n[0])
n
− β
]
= −2 + 4
(
eβ
1 + eβ
)
− β. (25)
The shrinkage, as a function of the true parameter β, is shown in Figure 1; it is negligible
when β is small, but increases linearly with it (in magnitude) for β outside the interval
(−2, 2). The reason for this is clear from the formula in Equation (24): the range of β˜,
the one-step estimate being (−2, 2).
In particular, note that this shrinkage is a highly desirable property in light of the
independence assumptions made in SNB. Indeed, the one-step procedure empirically out-
performs the full convergence IRLS when predictors are highly correlated and moreover
does not significantly underperform otherwise (tests were performed on all datasets to be
presented in §5). Therefore the one-step method is not only a computational necessity
for computing encrypted, but offers potential improvements in performance against the
standard algorithm.
Generalisation error
Define p = P[y = 1|x = 1, β] and p˜ = P[y = 1|x = 1, β˜]. Then, the generalisation error
for x = 1 can be written as
E[p˜− p] = E
[
eβ˜
1 + eβ˜
− p
]
(26)
and approximated by the polynomial
E[p˜− p] ≈ E
[
1
2
+
1
4
· β˜ − 1
48
· β˜3
]
− p. (27)
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Using the moment generating function for the Binomial distribution one can compute the
higher-order expectations and thus arrive at a formula which depends only on n and p,
E[p˜− p] ≈ − 1
6n2
(
8n2p3 − 12n2p2 + 6n2p− n2 − 24np3
+36np2 − 12np+ 16p3 − 24p2 + 8p) . (28)
The expression is dominated by p in the sense that even for very small values of n,
the generalisation error is close (according to our approximation) to the one obtained
asymptotically,
lim
n→∞
E[p˜− p] = −1
6
(2p− 1)3. (29)
Figure 2 (left) shows how the value of n affects the generalisation error; and Figure 2
(right) shows the speed at which the generalisation error converges to the one given by
the (approximate) asymptotic curve, for several values of p.
The generalisation error results highlight that while the estimates of the true class
conditional probabilities may be unstable, the classification error rate achieved by SNB
may be low as the classifier only has to get the prediction on the correct side of the
decision boundary.
4.2.4 Theoretical parameter requirements for Fan and Vercauteren (2012)
For a discussion of practical requirements for the parameter selection in homomorphic
encryption schemes, see Appendix B.
The SNB fitting and prediction for both paired and unpaired approximations are im-
plemented in the open source R package EncryptedStats (Aslett and Esperanc¸a, 2015)
and can be run on unencrypted data as well as data encrypted using the HomomophicEncryption
(Aslett, 2014a) package. These are briefly described in Appendix D.
In the next section, the two new machine learning techniques tailored for homomorphic
encryption which have been presented are empirically tested on a range of data sets and
a real example using a cluster of servers to fit a completely random forest is described.
5 Results
In this section we apply the encrypted machine learning methods presented in Sections
3 and 4 to a number of benchmark learning tasks.
5.1 Classification performance
We tested the methods on 20 data sets of varying type and dimension from the UCI ma-
chine learning data repository (Lichman, 2013), each of which is described in Appendix
E. For the purposes of achieving many test replicates, the results in this subsection were
generated from unencrypted runs (the code paths in the EncryptedStats package for
unencrypted and encrypted values are identical), with checks to ensure that the unen-
crypted and encrypted versions give the same results. Runtime performance for encrypted
versions are given below.
Figure 3 shows the comparison of these novel methods with each other as well as
with their traditional counterparts. The traditional methods included are full logistic
18 Aslett, Esperanc¸a & Holmes
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Figure 3: Performance of various methods. For each model and dataset, the AUC for 100
stratified randomisations of the training and testing sets; the horizontal lines represent
the frequency of class y = 1; an asterisk indicates the method can be computed encrypted.
regression (LR-full), Gaussian na¨ıve Bayes (GNB) and random forests (RF), none of which
can be computed within the constraints of homomorphic encryption. The methods of this
paper included are, completely random forests (CRF), paired (SNB-paired) and unpaired
(SNB-unpaired) semi-parametric na¨ıve Bayes, and multinomial na¨ıve Bayes (MNB). The
CRFs are all 100 trees grown 3 levels deep, including stochastic fraction estimate (M = 8).
The performance measure used is the area under the ROC curve (AUC, ranging from
0 to 1). For each model and dataset the algorithms were run with the same 100 strat-
ified randomisations of the training and testing sets (split in the proportion 80%/20%,
respectively), so that each point on the graph represents the AUC for one train/test split
and one method.
The first two data sets (infl and neph) are very easy classification problems and
the new techniques match the traditional techniques perfectly in this setting, keeping
almost uniformly good pace in the other rather easy data sets (bcw d, bcw o, monks3),
the unpaired SNB being the exception on bcw d.
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Unsurprisingly, the traditional random forest tends to perform best in the more chal-
lenging data sets (Ferna´ndez-Delgado et al., 2014), though only in 4 of the data sets is
it clearly outperforming all the other methods by the AUC metric. Indeed, in the most
challenging data sets (blood, bcw p and haber) the new methods proposed in this work
exhibit slightly better average performance than their counterparts.
The results of the unpaired SNB were performed without centring (which would be
equivalent to paired) and affirms the observation in the previous section that centring or
paired computation is always to be preferred where available.
The SNB method with IRLS run to convergence is not presented in the figure: as
alluded to in the previous section, the natural shrinkage of the one-step estimator meant
it performed equally well in most situations and in the chess and musk1 cases the average
ratio of full convergence over one-step AUCs was 0.76 and 0.67 respectively.
As an aside, the unencrypted version of these new methods have good computational
properties which will scale to massive data sets, because the most complex operations in-
volved are addition and multiplication which modern CPUs can evaluate with a few clock
cycles latency. In addition, in all cases even these simple operations can be performed in
parallel and map directly to CPU vector instructions.
5.2 Timings and memory use
All the encrypted methods presented in this work can be implemented to scale reasonably
linearly in the data set size, so performance numbers are provided per 100 observations
and per predictor (for logistic regression and semi-parametric na¨ıve Bayes) or per tree
(for completely random forests).
For reproducibility the timings were measured on a c4.8xlarge compute cluster Ama-
zon EC2 instance. This corresponds to 36 cores of an Intel Xeon E5-2666 v3 (Haswell)
CPU clocked at 2.9GHz. Table 1 shows the relevant timings using the EncryptedStats
and HomomorphicEncryption packages.
Table 1: Approximate running times (in seconds, on a c4.8xlarge EC2
instance) per 100 observations. SNB are per predictor; CRF is per tree,
L is the tree depth grown. (An ‘encrypted value’ is a single integer
value encrypted, so for example using quintiles each xij is stored as 5
encrypted values.)
Model
SNB-paired CRF, L = 1 CRF, L = 2 CRF, L = 3
Fitting 18.0 12.5 45.2 347
Prediction 7.8 15.1 48.3 353
Approx memory per
encrypted value
154KB 128KB 528KB 1, 672KB
Note that the CRF does not scale linearly in the depth of the tree grown, not only
because of the non-linear growth in computational complexity for trees but also because
as L increases so the parameters used for the Fan and Vercauteren (2012) scheme have to
be increased in such a way that raw performance of encrypted operations drops. This drop
is due to the increasing coefficient size and polynomial degree of the cipher text space.
See Appendix B for a discussion of the impact of tree parameters on the encryption
algorithm.
20 Aslett, Esperanc¸a & Holmes
5.3 Forest parameter choices
The completely random forest has a few choices which can tune the performance: number
of trees T , depth of trees to build L and whether to use stochastic fractions (and to what
upper estimate, M). An empirical examination of these now follows.
5.3.1 Forest trees and depth
We explored the effect of varying the number and depth of the trees used in the algorithm,
by varying T from 10 to 1000 and L from 1 to 6. We found a clear trend in most cases
that growing a large forest is much more important than tall trees: indeed, in many cases
1000 tree forests with 1 level perform equally well to those with 6 levels. Figure 7 in
Appendix F plots the results. The depth of trees only appears relevant in large forests
for the iono, magic and two musk data sets. This may indicate the data sets with more
non-linearities, a hypothesis supported by the poor performance of the linear methods in
these cases. Indeed, 1 level deep trees appear to be good candidates for additive models.
5.3.2 Stochastic fraction
The CRF algorithm presented in §3 has the option, presented in §3.2, of including an
unbiased encrypted stochastic fraction estimate in order to reduce the amount of shrinkage
that small leaves undergo. To analyse the impact that this has on the performance, the
AUC was recomputed after setting different values for M from 0 (i.e. original algorithm,
no stochastic fraction) through to 64 in all 100 train/test splits of the 20 datasets that
were presented already.
Figure 4 shows the results from the data set with the largest improvement in AUC
performance from among the 20 data sets when using the stochastic fraction estimate.
Improvements in AUC of up to 12.6% were achieved using the stochastic fraction versus
omitting it. All points which are above the y = x line indicate improvements in AUC
when using the stochastic fraction for the particular train/test split.
None of the 20 tested datasets decreased in average AUC with increasing M , but
Figure 5 shows the data set for which the AUC was least improved. In this instance it is
striking that all the points cluster around the y = x line, showing that in essence in the
worst case the stochastic fraction estimate has essentially negligible impact.
These figures empirically illustrate the fact that the stochastic fraction has the po-
tential to dramatically improve the performance of completely random forests, whilst not
really having a negative impact in those situations where it does not help. As such, it
would seem to make sense to include by default.
5.4 Case study in encrypted cloud computing machine learning
To demonstrate the potential to utilise cloud computing resources for sensitive data anal-
ysis we undertook a benchmark case study performed with fully encrypted data analysis
on the original Wisconsin breast cancer data set using a compute cluster of 1152 CPU
cores on Amazon Web Services, at a total cost of less than US$ 24 at the time of writing.
The resources used here are readily available to any scientist.
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Figure 4: The AUC change for iono data set with different values for M in the stochastic
fraction estimate. x-axis is always with no stochastic fraction estimate; y-axis is for shown
value of M ; one point per train/test split.
5.4.1 The problem setup
As mentioned earlier in §3.3.2, the completely random forest is amenable to embarrass-
ingly parallel computation, whereby the data can be split into shards using the same
random seed, the expensive fitting step performed on each shard, and the final fit pro-
duced by inexpensively summing the individual tree shards.
The training part of the Wisconsin data (n = 547) were initially split into shards of at
most 32 observations each, resulting in 17 full 32-observation shards and an 18th shard of 3
observations. These shards were then each encrypted using the HomomorphicEncryption
R package (Aslett, 2014a) under the Fan and Vercauteren scheme using parameters:
Φ = x8192 + 1
q = 2224
= 26959946667150639794667015087019630673637144422540572481103610249216
t = 200000
σ = 16
This renders a theoretical cipher text size of 2 × 8192 × 224 ÷ (8 × 1024) = 448KB per
encrypted value, ignoring keys and overhead. These parameters offer around 158-bits of
security (using bounds in Lindner and Peikert (2011)) — informally this means on the
order of 2158 fundamental operations must be performed on average in order to break the
encryption. On disk, each gzipped shard of 32 cipher texts for the predictors occupied
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Figure 5: The AUC change for bcw p data set with different values for M in the stochastic
fraction estimate. x-axis is always with no stochastic fraction estimate; y-axis is for shown
value of M ; one point per train/test split.
about 737MB and for the responses occupied about 33.7MB, for a total disk space of
around 13.8GB.
This data was uploaded to an Amazon S3 bucket, with the transfer time using the
University internet connection being approximately 16 minutes. If this data was to be
stored long-term on Amazon S3, it would cost US$ 0.42 per month at the time of writing.
Once the data was in place, an Amazon SQS queue was setup in which to store a ref-
erence to each shard. This queue acts as a simple job dispatch system, designed to ensure
that each server in the cluster can remain completely independent for maximum speed,
by eliminating inter-server communication and as a mechanism to ensure no duplication
of work.
With these elements in place, the RStudio AMI ami-628c8a0a (Aslett, 2014b) was
extended to add a startup script which (in summary) fetches the work to perform from the
SQS queue, downloads it from S3, executes the forest building using the EncryptedStats
R package, and uploads the result to the S3 bucket.
5.4.2 The fitting run
The fitting run used Amazon’s spot instances: these are a ‘stock market’ for unused
capacity, where it is often possible to bid below the list price for compute servers. The
completely random forest is well suited to exploiting low spot prices on EC2 wherever
they may arise because it can be formulated in an embarrassingly parallel manner and
launched in very geographically dispersed regions without regard for connectivity speeds,
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since communication costs between nodes are effectively zero.
When the run was performed on 5th May 2015, the spot price for c3.8xlarge instances
was lowest in Dublin, Ireland and Sa˜o Paulo, Brazil. Consequently, the data was repli-
cated to two S3 buckets local to these regions and the customised AMI copied. Then a
cluster of 18 c3.8xlarge servers was launched in each region, giving a total of 1, 152 CPU
cores and 2, 160GB of RAM.
Each server was setup to compute 50 trees on its shard of data and every shard was
handed out twice so that a total of 100 trees were fitted. Tree growth for the two different
sets of 50 trees were initialised from a common random seed, eliminating the need for
servers to communicate the trees grown.
After 1 hour and 36 minutes the cluster had completed the full run and finished
uploading the encrypted tree fit (that is, encrypted versions of ρ¯tbc ∀ t, b, c) back to the
S3 bucket. The total space required for storing the 36 forests of 50 trees fitted on each
shard was 15.6GB. At this juncture, the forests could be combined homomorphically to
produce a single forest of 100 trees which would then require 868MB to store. Note that
with the tree fitted, it would then be possible to archive the 13.8GB of original data so
that only 868MB needs to be stored long term or downloaded.
The cost of the 36 machines for 2 hours was US$ 23.86 (about £ 15.66). Note that
the spot prices were not exceptionally low on the day in question and no effort was made
to select an opportune moment. By the same token the price is inherently variable and
it may be necessary to wait a short time for favourable spot prices to arise if there are
none at the time of analysis.
5.4.3 Results
The encrypted version of the forest was downloaded, decrypted and compared to the
results achieved when performing the same fit using an unencrypted version of the
data, starting tree growth from the same seeds and using identical R code from the
EncryptedStats package (separate code is not required due to the HomomorphicEncryption
package fully supporting operator overloading). The resultant fit from both encrypted
and unencrypted computation was in exact agreement.
6 Discussion
Fully homomorphic encryption schemes open up the prospect of privacy preserving ma-
chine learning applications. However practical constraints of existing FHE schemes de-
mand tailored approaches. With this aim we made bespoke adjustments to two popular
machine learning methods, namely extremely random forests and naive Bayes classifiers,
and demonstrated their performance on a variety of classifier learning tasks. We found
the new methods to be competitive against their unencrypted counterparts.
To the best of our knowledge these represent the first machine learning schemes tai-
lored explicitly for homomorphic encryption so that all stages (fitting and prediction) can
be performed encrypted without any multi-party computation or communication.
Furthermore, the unencrypted version of these new methods will scale to massive
data sets, because the most complex operations involved are addition and multiplication.
Indeed, even these simple operations can be performed in parallel for most of the presented
algorithms and map directly to CPU vector instructions. This is an interesting avenue of
future research.
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A Completely Random Forest (CRF) algorithm
In detail, consider a training set with N observations consisting of a categorical response,
yi ∈ C, and P predictors, xip, (categorical / ordinal / continuous), for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, p ∈
{1, . . . , P}. All variables (predictors and response) are first transformed using method
1 from §2.2.2 prior to encryption. Thus, yi → y˜ic ∈ {0, 1} for c ∈ {1, . . . , |C|} and
xip → x˜ipk. Consider these herein to be in encrypted form.
The proposed algorithm for Completely Random Forests (CRFs) is then as follows:
Algorithm
1. Specify the number of trees to grow, T , and the depth to make each tree, L.
2. For each t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, build a tree in the forest:
(a) Tree growth: For each l ∈ {1, . . . , L}, build a level:
i. Level l will have 2l−1 branches (splits), each of which will have a partition
applied as follows. For each b ∈ {1, . . . , 2l−1}, construct the partitions:
A. Splitting variable: Select a variable ptlb at random from among
the P predictors. Due to the encoding of §2.2.2, this variable has a
partition Kptlb associated with it.
B. Split point: Create a partition of Kptlb at random in order to perform
a split on variable ptlb, Dtlb = {Dtlb1 , Dtlb2 } where each Dtlbj =
⋃
Kptlbi for
some Kptlbi ∈ Kptlb , with Dtlb1 ∩Dtlb2 = ∅ and Dtlb1 ∪Dtlb2 =
⋃
∀ iK
ptlb
i .
Note that for categorical predictors this is a random assignment of
levels from the partition Kptlb to each Dtlbj , while for ordinal predictors
a split point is chosen and the partition formed by the levels either
side of the split.
Note also the indexing of Dtlb to emphasise if variable ptlb is selected
more than once (in different levels or trees) a different random split is
chosen.
(b) Tree fitting: The total number of training observations belonging to category
c in the completely randomly grown tree t at terminal leaf b ∈ {1, . . . , 2L} is
then:
ρ¯tbc =
N∑
i=1
y˜ic
L∏
l=1
 ∑
k∈Dtlg(b,l)
h(b,l)
x˜i, ptlg(b,l), k

where
g(b, l) :=
⌈
b
2L+1−l
⌉
h(b, l) :=
⌊
(b− 1) mod 2L+1−l
2L−l
⌋
+ 1
Figure 6 (page 28) is useful for understanding this.
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Note in particular that written this way ρ¯tbc is simply a polynomial and can
be computed homomorphically with multiplicative depth L. Both g(·, ·) and
h(·, ·) involve only indices of the algorithm which will not be encrypted. Thus,
the training data can be evaluated on the tree without the use of comparisons.
The total number of training observations in this terminal leaf is then simply:
ρt
b
=
|C|∑
c=1
ρ¯tbc
Thus a single tree, t, fitted to a set of training data, is defined by the tuple of
sets:
{ptlb : l = {1, . . . , L}, b = {1, . . . , 2l−1}}
{Dtlb : l = {1, . . . , L}, b = {1, . . . , 2l−1}}
{ρ¯tbc : b = {1, . . . , 2L−1}, c = {1, . . . , |C|}}
3. Prediction: Once the forest has been grown, attention turns to prediction. Given
an encrypted test observation with predictors x˜?jk, the objective is to predict the
response category. Define yˆ?c to be the number of votes for response category c,
which can be simply computed as:
yˆ?c =
T∑
t=1
2L∑
b=1
ρ¯tbc
L∏
l=1
 ∑
k∈Dtlg(b,l)
h(b,l)
x˜?ptlg(b,l), k

where g(·, ·) and h(·, ·) are as defined above. Each yˆ?c is returned from the cloud to
the client. The client decrypts and forms a predictive empirical ‘probability’ as:
pˆ?c =
yˆ?c∑|C|
c=1 yˆ
?
c
(30)
Hence, the proposed CRF algorithm makes use of a quantisation procedure on the
data, followed by completely random selection of variable and completely random parti-
tion on the quantile bins, in order to eliminate any need to perform comparisons.
Tree growth (2a) occurs unencrypted and is a very fast operation.
Tree fitting (2b) involves counting the number of training observations which lie in
each terminal node of each tree. In computing ρ¯tbc, the inner sum evaluates whether an
observation has predictor value in the relevant partition at level l of tree t (by (2)). The
product over all levels then results in 1 if and only if the observation lies in this path
through the tree. Finally, multiplication by y˜ic ensures the observation only counts if it
belongs to response category c.
If growing a tree encrypted is the objective then at this point the resulting ρ¯tbc can be
decrypted. Alternatively, without decrypting it is possible to immediately predict with
the tree, using a similar procedure of evaluating an effectively binary circuit representation
of the tree and data.
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Figure 6: Completely Random Forest algorithm depiction. The dashed line shows the
evaluation of a training/testing observation via the g and h functions. b signifies the
branch number at the given level l.
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B Theoretical parameter requirements for Fan and
Vercauteren (2012)
B.1 Completely Random Forests parameter requirements
In order to be able to fit extremely random forests of T trees each of depth L encrypted
under the scheme of Fan and Vercauteren (2012), the parameter choice must support at
least L-depth multiplications. Additionally, the message space must support coefficient
values up to size T max{∑i y˜ic : c = 1, . . . , |C|}, since all values will accumulate on the
first coefficient of m˚(x). This covers the most extreme (and improbable) possibility that
a leaf in every tree contains all the observations for a particular class.
In the event that the stochastic fraction variant is used, the parameters must support a
total of at least L+M multiplications. If prediction is to be performed without decrypting
the tree or refreshing the noise in the tree cipher text, then the scheme must support an
additional L multiplications on top of the values above.
The function parsHelp in the HomomorphicEncryption package (Aslett, 2014a) can
be used to guide selection of the scheme parameters d, t, q, and σ which will enable the
multiplicative depth and maximum coefficient values required.
B.2 Semiparametric Na¨ıve Bayes parameter requirements
In order to be able to fit SNB encrypted under the scheme of Fan and Vercauteren (2012)
(Aslett, Esperanc¸a and Holmes, 2015), the coefficients {ej, dj}j∈N1:P must be returned
for offline assembly via Equation (11) (because homomorphic divisions are not possible),
together with the empirical class frequencies. The former have multiplicative depth equal
to 4 and 3, respectively, and the later equal to 0. With respect to the growth in mes-
sage coefficient size for the FandV scheme, the biggest growth comes from computing dj
in Equation (17). As described in detail in Aslett, Esperanc¸a and Holmes (2015), ini-
tially the polynomial representation of all xij will have maximum coefficient value of 1.
Therefore, by the multinomial theorem the maximum coefficient value of the polynomial
representation of x2ij will be 2. Thus the maximum coefficient for the first term is 2N .
In contrast, the maximum coefficient of
∑
i xij will be N , so that by the multinomial
theorem the maximum coefficient value of the polynomial representation of (
∑
i xij)
2 will
be 2N2. Therefore to ensure correct decryption after fitting the nave Bayes model the
message space must support coefficient values up to size 2N2.
The exclusion of the intercept term has an impact on these requirements and, con-
sequently, on the running time of the algorithm. Precisely, numerator and denominator
of βˆ have multiplicative depth equal to 2 and 1, respectively, in this case. The message
coefficient requirements will also be significantly relaxed, with the maximum coefficient
value being 2N .
C Multinomial Na¨ıve Bayes algorithm
The Multinomial Na¨ıve Bayes (MNB) classifier estimates P(xj|y) and P(y) using the
corresponding empirical probabilities,
pˆxj=k|y=c =
#{X•j = k ∧ Y = c}
#{Y = c} and pˆy=c =
#{Y = c}
N
(31)
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where #{z} is the cardinality of the set satisfying condition z; k denotes the kth pos-
sible value taken by xij ∈ N1:Mj ; and X•j and Y are N -dimensional vectors of obser-
vations for predictor j and response, respectively. The “Multinomial” qualifier should
be understood to mean precisely that xij takes values in the discrete set N1:Mj and so
X = N1:M1 × · · · × N1:MP .
Because it is not possible to perform homomorphic divisions, the algorithms will be
written in terms of unnormalised probabilities, or counts:
pˆ
(u)
xj=k|y=c = #{X•j = k ∧ Y = c} and pˆ(u)y=c = #{Y = c}. (32)
Estimation, therefore, requires the computation of pˆ
(u)
xj |y and pˆ
(u)
y for all possible values
of y and xj, and for all j ∈ N1:P . This corresponds to a 2 × Mj table of conditional
probabilities for each predictor j ∈ N1:P ; plus two class probabilities. In total, this makes
2 + 2 ·∑Pj=1Mj parameters.
A computational problem arises from the fact that pˆ
(u)
xj |y can not be computed directly:
since the values xij are encrypted, this makes it impossible to count, say, the number of
2s in the vector X•j directly. An indirect route follows from the first quantisation method
in Section 2.2.2. Let X˜ denote the binary-expanded version of X; and x˜ijk denote the
kth bin of X˜ij• = (x˜ij1, . . . , x˜ijMj). Then, the conditional counts can be computed as
pˆ
(u)
xj=k|y=1 =
N∑
i=1
x˜ijkyi and pˆ
(u)
xj=k|y=0 =
N∑
i=1
x˜ijk(1− yi). (33)
and the class counts as
pˆ
(u)
y=1 =
N∑
i=1
yi and pˆ
(u)
y=0 = N −
N∑
i=1
yi. (34)
The multiplicative depth of pˆ
(u)
y is 0, while that of pˆ
(u)
xj |y is 1. As standard practice, imple-
mentations should use Laplace-smoothed counts or probabilities to avoid the problems
arising from having zero counts for some values of k.
Classification of an observation X? = {x?j}j∈N1:P requires the computation of the
factors
Fc = P(y = c)
P∏
j=1
P(x?j |y = c)
= N−1
(
pˆ(u)y=c
)−(P−1) P∏
j=1
pˆ
(u)
x?j |y=c
(35)
for c ∈ {0, 1}. If X? is known only in encrypted format, then pˆ(u)x?j |y=c must be computed
indirectly as
pˆ
(u)
x?j |y=c =
Mj∑
k=1
x˜?jk · pˆ(u)xj=k|y=c (36)
where X˜?j = {x˜?jk}k∈N1:Mj is the binary expanded version of x?j ; and which has multiplica-
tive depth equal to 2. The predicted probability of X? belonging to class y = 1 is then
P(y = 1|X?) = F1/(F0 + F1), a final step which must be computed offline.
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It should be noted that homomorphic MNB requires the use of binary-expanded data
(X˜) as opposed to integer data (X). This has a direct impact on the computational cost
(as it leads to a larger number of homomorphic operations; recall Equations (33) and
(36)) and memory requirements (as the data must be represented in the binary-expanded
form).
In the next Section (§4.1) an alternative approach is suggested which mitigates some
of these problems, while still relying on NB assumption.
Theoretical parameter requirements for Fan and Vercauteren
(2012)
For MNB, the elements to be returned are pˆ
(u)
y=c and pˆ
(u)
x?j |y=c, for j ∈ N1:P and c ∈ {0, 1},
with the former having multiplicative depth equal to 0 and the later equal to 2.
It is possible reduce the number of elements to be returned to 4 by computing
(pˆ
(u)
y=c)P−1 and
∏P
j=1 pˆ
(u)
x?j |y=c homomorphically but this comes at the cost of an increase
in the multiplicative depth to P − 1 and 3P − 1, respectively.
D Open source software contributions
We have contributed two open source R packages which make working with the techniques
described and contributed herein easy.
The first, HomomorphicEncryption (Aslett, 2014a), implements the Fan and Ver-
cauteren (2012) homomorphic encryption scheme in a generic framework which can be
extended to plug in other encryption schemes over time. The package is written in high
performance C++ and utilises full operator overloading in R. Indeed, all common types
such as vectors and matrices are implemented so that they can be transparently encrypted
and manipulated just like their unencrypted counterparts. The theoretical security and
multiplicative depth bound results of different papers are wrapped in a helper function
to aid in parameter choice.
The second, EncryptedStats (Aslett and Esperanc¸a, 2015), implements the tailored
machine learning methods of this paper in such as way as to enable fitting and prediction
on unencrypted and encrypted data using precisely the same code paths (thanks to the
operator overloading support of HomomorphicEncryption).
D.1 Introduction to the HomomorphicEncryption package
There are three steps to encrypting data using the package: i) parameter selection; ii)
key generation; and iii) encryption/decryption. Once these are understood, then homo-
morphic operations follow naturally from operator overloading.
Parameter selection
The scheme of Fan and Vercauteren (2012) has four parameters which must be selected.
In the package these are referred to as:
• d, the power of the cyclotomic polynomial ring (default 4096);
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• sigma, the standard deviation of the discrete Gaussian used to induce a distribution
on the cyclotomic polynomial ring (default 16.0);
• qpow, the power of 2 to use for the coefficient modulus (default 128);
• t, the value to use for the message space modulus (default 32768).
which are arguments of the pars function, the first argument of which selects the encryp-
tion scheme to use. Presently only Fan and Vercauteren (2012) is implemented ("FandV").
Say the defaults are acceptable except for the message space modulus which should be
doubled, it could be set by running:
> p <- pars("FandV", t=65536)
> p
Fan and Vercauteren parameters
phi = x^4096+1
q = 340282366920938463463374607431768211456 (128-bit integer)
t = 65536
delta = 5192296858534827628530496329220096
sigma = 16
Security level approx 128-bits
Supports multiplicative depth of 3 with overwhelming probability
(i.e. lower bound, likely more possible)
The selection of these parameters can be bewildering, so a feature of the package is a
parameter helper function parsHelp which has a simpler set of options and will use the-
oretical bounds from the cryptography literature to automatically select the parameters
for you. These simpler choices are:
• lambda, the security level required (bits), default is 80;
• max, the largest absolute value you will need to store encrypted, default is 1000;
• L, the deepest multiplication depth you need to be able to evaluate encrypted,
default is 4.
So, for example, we could have selected the ability to store a larger message, but requiring
at least 140 bits of security:
> p <- parsHelp("FandV", lambda=140, max=65536)
> p
Fan and Vercauteren parameters
phi = x^8192+1
q = 365375409332725729550921208179070754913983135744 (158-bit integer)
t = 131072
delta = 2787593149816327892691964784081045188247552
sigma = 16
Security level approx 273-bits
Supports multiplicative depth of 4 with overwhelming probability
(i.e. lower bound, likely more possible)
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Note that the parameter helper will often be conservative in setting the security level:
the theoretical bounds may not allow all constraints to be simultaneously satisfied exactly
and so the security is treated as a minimum required level.
Key generation
With the parameter values stored in the output from either the pars or parsHelp func-
tions, generating the keys is then straight-forward:
> keys <- keygen(p)
The public key is stored in keys$pk, the secret key in keys$sk and the relinearisation
key (used during multiplication operations) in keys$rlk.
In order to save the keys for future use (or to give the public key to another party),
see the saveFHE and loadFHE functions in the package.
Encryption/Decryption
Encryption and decryption take place according to the same format as in §2, with en-
cryption requiring only the public key and decryption only the secret key:
> ct <- enc(keys$pk, 2)
> ct
Fan and Vercauteren cipher text
( c_0 = 13x^4096+137352383756050088155497465542996641770x^4095+7041424...,
c_1 = -46602244866771058520503760576262076531x^4095-4071136373586351... )
> m <- dec(keys$sk, ct)
> m
[1] 2
Homomorphic operations
Using homomorphic operations is the simplest aspect of all, because the package operator
overloads + and × (*) operations and also implements native support for vectors and
matrices being encrypted to cipher texts.
The following example mixes scalars, vectors and matrices and showcases both scalar
and matrix operations:
> x <- 2
> y <- c(1,2,3)
> z <- matrix(1:9, nrow=3)
> z
[,1] [,2] [,3]
[1,] 1 4 7
[2,] 2 5 8
[3,] 3 6 9
> xct <- enc(keys$pk, x)
> yct <- enc(keys$pk, y)
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> zct <- enc(keys$pk, z)
> res <- x + y %*% t(z) %*% z
> resct <- xct + yct %*% t(zct) %*% zct
> res
[,1] [,2] [,3]
[1,] 230 554 878
> dec(keys$sk, resct)
[,1] [,2] [,3]
[1,] 230 554 878
D.2 Introduction to the EncryptedStats package
The first two methods implemented in the package are the two methods presented in this
paper.
Completely Random Forests
There are three steps in working with CRFs in the package: i) grow a forest; ii) fit data
to each tree (accumulate votes); and iii) predict a new observation.
When working with CRFs, the data must already be in the representation of Method
1 from §2.2.2 in either an encrypted or unencrypted matrix in R.
Imagine a toy data set consisting of N observations of two variables (v1 and v2) where
the first is ordinal and the second categorical. Assume that these are in quintiles so that
the data matrix is N × 10, stored in the variable called X, say, in R. Also assume the
responses of the training observations are similarly stored in y.
i) Forest growth
Tree growth is blind from the data, so you only need to identify the variable names of
each column of the (un)encrypted data matrix and their type — either ordinal ("ord")
or categorical ("cat"). For the toy example,
> Xvars <- rep(c("v1", "v2"), each=5)
> Xvars
[1] "v1" "v1" "v1" "v1" "v1" "v2" "v2" "v2" "v2" "v2"
This vector of names is used to tell the tree growth algorithm that the first 5 columns
of X contain a quantisation of variable v1 and the second 5 columns contain a quantisation
of variable v2.
> Xtype <- c("v1"="ord", "v2"="cat")
> Xtype
v1 v2
"ord" "cat"
This vector then specifies the type for each variable. Together these can be passed to
the forest growth algorithm, along with the specification of the number of trees to grow
(T) and how deep to grow the trees (L):
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> forest <- CRF.grow(Xvars, Xtype, T=200, L=2)
ii) Fit the data
The fitting step is now straight-forward. The forest is given to the fitting function,
together with the data matrix and the responses, either encrypted or unencrypted. The
only additional option is what size of stochastic fraction estimate to use (the M parameter
from §3.2), passed as argument resamp.
To do this unencrypted, one simply runs:
> fit <- CRF.fit(forest, X, y, resamp=8)
If X and y are encrypted, then the algorithm requires the value 1 encrypted, as well
as M both encrypted and in plain text, since the stochastic fraction estimate is M −∑M
i=1 ηi + 1, where the ηi come from X. Therefore, the public key must be provided so
that the algorithm can produce encrypted versions of these,
> fit <- CRF.fit(forest, X, y, resamp=8, pk=keys$pk)
For the Fan and Vercauteren (2012) scheme in particular, it is possible to add un-
encrypted values to encrypted ones knowing only the parameters of the scheme, so this
requirement may be removed in a future release of the package.
iii) Prediction
Imagine now that there are N ′ test observations for the toy example, similarly stored
in an unencrypted or encrypted N ′ × P matrix, newX. Then prediction proceeds using
the forest and fit from the previous commands:
> pred <- CRF.pred(forest, fit, newX)
For similar reasons to above, the public key is required when computing with en-
crypted data,
> pred <- CRF.pred(forest, fit, newX, pk=keys$pk)
Upon completion, pred will be an N ′× 2 matrix with votes for class j on observation
i being in the (i, j)th entry.
Semi-parametric Na¨ıve Bayes
There are two steps in working with the SNB classifier in the package: i) fit a model to
the data, i.e., estimate the factors that make up the parameters {θˆ, αˆ, βˆ}; ii) predict a
new observation.
The user has the choice of working with encrypted or unencrypted data (this is auto-
matically detected), with the provision that both steps must use the same type of data,
i.e., either both use encrypted data or both use unecrypted data.
Assume we have an N × P design matrix X and a length N binary response vector
y; and let cX and cy denote the corresponding ciphertexts, encrypted with the package
HomomorphicEncryption (see §D.1).
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i) Estimation
Besides the data there are only two parameters in the estimation step: paired controls
whether paired or unpaired optimisation is to be used (see §4.2); and pk is the public
key used to encrypt cX and cy — it is used to encrypt some constants required in the
estimation process and is only needed if encrypted data is used.
Estimating the class counts {counts(y = 0), counts(y = 1)} and the coefficients
{aj, bj, dj} and is then straightforward using the fitting function SNB.fit. Say N = 10
and P = 2; then, with unencrypted data we obtain
> snb1.fit <- SNB.fit(X, y, paired=T)
> snb1.fit
$counts.y
[1] 4 6
$coeffs
[,1] [,2]
a 110 462
b -8 -120
d 221 105
while with encrypted data we obtain
> snb2.fit <- SNB.fit(cX, cy, paired=T, pk=keys$pk)
> snb2.fit
$counts.y
Vector of 2 Fan and Vercauteren cipher texts
$coeffs
Matrix of 3 x 2 Fan and Vercauteren cipher texts
We can then confirm that encrypted and decrypted results match:
> dec(keys$sk, snb2.fit$counts.y) == snb1.fit$counts.y
[1] TRUE TRUE
> dec(keys$sk, snb2.fit$coeffs) == snb1.fit$coeffs
[,1] [,2]
a TRUE TRUE
b TRUE TRUE
d TRUE TRUE
ii) Prediction
The function SNB.fit generates an object of class SNB, which can be directly fed
into the base R predict function. Apart from the fitted model and the testing data
newX, there are only two parameters: type controls the type of prediction to the returned
(raw coefficients or conditional class probabilities); sk is the secret key — required if
predictions are to be decrypted.
Continuing the example above, we can obtain the probabilities of class y = 1,
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> snb2.predProb <- predict(model=snb.fit2, newX=cX, type="prob", sk=keys$sk)
> snb2.predProb
[1] 0.2212818 0.1973391 0.7221404 0.8975560 0.7293452 0.4353264 0.4621838
[8] 0.4442447 0.7364313 0.8907048
or obtain the class counts and coefficients {eij, dj} (see §4.2) for all testing observations,
> snb2.predRaw <- predict(model=snb.fit2, newX=cX, type="raw", sk=keys$sk)
> snb2.predRaw
$counts.y
[1] 4 6
$coeffs.e
[,1] [,2]
[1,] 102 -138
[2,] 70 -138
[3,] 86 102
[4,] 102 222
[5,] 94 102
[6,] 70 -18
[7,] 94 -18
[8,] 78 -18
[9,] 102 102
[10,] 86 222
$coeffs.d
[1] 221 105
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E Details of data sets
Table 2: Dimensions of the data sets used (shown in the same order as in Figure 3). All
data sets were extracted from UCI Machine Learning Repository (Lichman, 2013).
#obs1 #obs2 #vars1 #vars2 #vars3
acute inflammation 120 120 6 11 15
acute nephritis 120 120 6 11 15
adult income 48842 45222 14 105 129
bank marketing 41188 30488 20 57 97
blood transfusion 748 748 3 3 15
breast cancer wisc diag 569 569 30 30 150
breast cancer wisc orig 699 683 9 9 45
breast cancer wisc prog 198 194 32 32 160
chess krvkp 3196 3196 36 73 73
haberman survival 306 306 3 14 22
heart disease cleveland 303 297 13 28 48
ionosphere 351 351 32 32 160
magic telescope 19020 19020 10 10 50
mammographic masses 961 830 4 14 18
monks3 554 554 6 17 17
musk1 476 476 166 166 830
musk2 6598 6598 166 166 830
ozone 1hr 2536 1848 72 72 360
spambase 4601 4601 57 57 285
#obs1: number of observations in the original dataset; #obs2: number of observations after removing missing data; #vars1:
number of predictors in the original dataset; #vars2: number of predictors after transforming factors into sets of binaries
(which increases the number of predictors) and continuous predictors into quintile-discretised predictors (which does not
increase the number of predictors); #vars3: number of predictors after also transforming quintile predictors into sets of
binaries.
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Figure 7: Performance of various methods. For each model and dataset, the AUC for 100
stratified randomisations of the training and testing sets; the horizontal lines represent
the frequency of class y = 1. M = 8 throughout.
